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Abstract 
 
Based on a summary of prior literature, I conclude that tests of statistical significance harm scientific 
progress. Efforts to find exceptions to this conclusion have, to date, turned up none. Even when done 
correctly, significance tests are dangerous. I show that summaries of scientific research do not require tests 
of statistical significance. I illustrate the dangers of significance tests by examining an application to the 
M3-Competition. Although the authors of that reanalysis conducted a proper series of statistical tests, they 
suggest that the original M3 was not justified in concluding that combined forecasts reduce errors and that 
the selection of the best method is dependent upon the selection of a proper error measure. I show that the 
original conclusions were justified and that they are correct. Authors should try to avoid tests of statistical 
significance, journals should discourage them, and readers should ignore them. Instead, to analyze and 
communicate findings from empirical studies, one should use effect sizes, confidence intervals, 
replications/extensions, and meta-analyses. 
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Tests of statistical significance became popular in the social sciences only in the last century. While only 
about 10% of empirical papers published in psychology journals included such tests in the early 1900s, this 
grew to over 90% by 1970 (Hubbard & Ryan 2000). In contrast, as noted by Schmidt and Hunter (1997), 
statistical significance is seldom used in the physical sciences such as physics and chemistry and many 
scientists in these areas regard its use as unscientific. 
 
Statistical significance in commonly used in empirical research on forecasting, as can be seen by picking up 
any copy of a forecasting journal. For example, I coded the 12 papers in the first issue of the 2005 volume 
of the International Journal of Forecasting. Of these, 11 used tests of statistical significance. (I was an 
author in one of these.) 
 
Despite its popularity, many researchers have warned against the use of tests of statistical significance. 
Schmidt and Hunter (1997, p. 38) concluded, “ . . . reliance on significance testing is logically indefensible 
and retards the research enterprise by making it difficult to develop cumulative knowledge.”  
 
In this paper, I draw upon prior literature to summarize problems with statistical significance testing. I
then demonstrate that such tests are unnecessary when summarizing scientific evidence. Finally, I apply
these concepts to a recent study that applied statistical significance testing to the M3-competition.
Problems with Statistical Significance 
Researchers have argued that tests of statistical significance are confusing and misleading since 1931 at 
least. The criticisms have been more common in recent years. They find that  
• researchers publish faulty interpretations of statistical significance in leading economics journals 
(McCloskey and Ziliak 1996), in psychology (Cohen 1988), and other areas (Hubbard & Bayarri 
2003).  
• journal reviewers misinterpret statistical significance (e.g., see the experiment by Atkinson, 
Furlong, and Wampold 1982).  
• general readers misinterpret tests of statistical significance even after training; for example, my 
experience is that few students in MBA programs are able to properly interpret tests of statistical 
significance. 
 
The confusion harms the development of science in a number of ways. One is that there is a bias against 
publishing papers that fail to reject the null hypothesis (Hubbard & Armstrong 1992). Papers that fail to 
reject null hypotheses might contain important findings.  
 
Another problem arises from the selection of null hypotheses. A null hypothesis is generally selected for its 
simplicity, not for its truth or for its importance to decision making. For example, in trying to forecast the 
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effect of prices of automobiles on automobile sales, one would test the null hypothesis that price is 
unrelated to sales. By finding that the results reject the null hypothesis, one learns nothing new. Cohen 
(1988) refers to such meaningless null hypotheses as “nil hypotheses.” It is possible to develop meaningful 
null hypotheses under some conditions; however, as explained below, this is unnecessary. 
 
Still another problem is that statistical significance testing distracts attention from key issues. It leads 
researchers to think they have completed the analysis even though much remains to be done. The focus 
should be on assessing effect size (e.g., an estimate of practical significance, such as how much 
improvement in accuracy is provided by a given method under certain conditions). Effect sizes are 
important for the advancement of science. For example, when scientists tried to estimate the distance from 
the earth to the sun, they presented their estimates and confidence intervals, not tests of statistical 
significance. Forecasting practitioners also need effect sizes and prediction intervals. 
 
Here is an example of how statistical significance has misled researchers. In a study on predicting how 
nonrespondents would have replied to mail surveys, Wright and Armstrong (2006) found that the use of 
statistical significance testing led researchers to conclude that adjustment for non-response bias was 
unnecessary in 92% of the 38 studies in our sample. In fact, none of the studies in the sample made an 
adjustment for non-response bias. Judging from the original study, we estimate that non-response bias 
should have been predicted and adjusted for 111 of the variables in those studies. 
 
Significance tests can also harm practice. In their simulation study, Goodwin and Lawton (2003), found 
that the use of significance tests harmed accuracy in comparison with a rule that one should correct all 
judgmental forecasts to remove systematic bias. 
 
The above discussion of problems looks to be one-sided. Are there good reasons for using significance 
tests? I have circulated working drafts of this paper and received peer review from nine people. In addition, 
three anonymous reviewers have commented. I made further attempts at gaining peer review by posting 
drafts on my homepage and by soliciting feedback for academic email lists. Schmidt and Hunter (1997) had 
conducted a much more extensive search. In doing so, they examined objections to the conclusion that 
significance testing should be avoided. They discuss and refute the eight most commonly stated objections 
and found no merit in another 79 objections. These objections were obtained in their three-year effort to 
have researchers submit cases in which significance tests made a contribution; no cases were found. They 
concluded, “Statistical significance testing retards the growth of scientific knowledge; it never makes a 
scientific contribution.”  
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Statistical Significance is Unnecessary for Communicating Scientific Advances 
Armstrong (2001a) presents evidence on 139 forecasting principles. The principles would be the same had 
tests of statistical significance been removed from all of the papers that were used. In my own chapters, I 
provided meta-analyses for role-playing (p. 26), judgmental bootstrapping (p. 182), and combining (p. 
428). Only effect sizes were used. I challenge readers to show how tests of statistical significance would 
have led to better estimates.  
 
More recently (Armstrong 2006), I reviewed evidence on which methods have been shown to improve the 
accuracy of forecasts over the past quarter century. The word “significance” does not appear in the paper. 
 
I have spent many years summarizing evidence-based persuasion principles. This involves summarizing 
evidence on many hundreds of research papers. The word “significance” appears only in the paragraph 
where I explain why it is unnecessary to report on significance.  
 
What should one do without tests of statistical significance? There are better ways to report findings. To 
assess— 
 • importance, use effect sizes. 
•  confidence, use prediction intervals  
•  replicability, use replications and extensions.  
•  generality, use meta-analyses.  
 
Significance Testing of the M3-Competition 
 
The dangers involved with testing statistical significance apply even when the testing is properly done and 
fully reported. I use a recent application of statistical significance testing in forecasting to illustrate the 
dangers.   
 
Koning, Franses, Hibon and Stekler (2005), referred to hereafter as KFHS, used tests of statistical 
significance to support their claim that such tests should be used in forecasting. They examined four 
conclusions from the M3-Competition (Makridakis and Hibon 2000) that had been reached without testing 
for statistical significance. By using significance tests, KFHS found that two of the conclusions were in 
agreement with the original study, while two differed. I examined the conclusions that differed; one relates 
to combining forecasts, and the other to the selection of an accuracy measure. 
 
Combined forecasts  
The authors of the M3-Competition concluded that a combined forecast (of three extrapolation methods) 
was more accurate because its error was 4.7% less than that from the typical method used to create the 
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combined forecast. After statistical testing of these results, however, KFHS (which includes one of the 
original M3-Competition authors) stated “ . . . the M3 conclusion about the combination of [forecasts] 
being statistically superior has not been proven.” How might a practicing forecaster interpret this 
conclusion? I expect that many would conclude from this statement that combining forecasts will not 
improve accuracy and, since it costs more, that they should not combine forecasts.  
 
The null hypothesis used in KFHS is that combining does not improve accuracy when judged against all of 
the components. This null hypothesis only of interest to practitioners if they are certain a priori which of 
the methods is most accurate, a highly unusual situation. Furthermore, there may be conditions under which 
the combined forecast is expected to be more accurate than the most accurate component. 
Prior research has been done to address the issue of whether combining is more accurate than the typical 
component. This is the typical issue facing the forecasters. Armstrong (2001) summarized 30 studies 
published prior to the M3-competition. Full disclosure on this analysis is provided in Armstrong (2001b, p. 
417).  
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 Table: Error Reductions from Combining Ex Ante Forecasts 
 
Study 
 
Methods 
 
Components
 
Criterion 
 
Data 
 
Situation 
 
Validation
Forecasts 
 
Forecast 
Horizon 
 
Percent 
error 
reduction
Levine (1960) intentions   2 MAPE annual capital expenditures        6 1 18.0 
Okun (1960) “   2 “ “ housing starts        6 1   7.0 
Landefeld & Seskin (1986) “   2 MAE “ plant & equipment      11 1 20.0 
Armstrong et al. (2000) “ 4 RAE “ consumer products      65 varied 5.5 
 
Winkler & Poses (1993) expert   4 Brier cross-section survival of patients    231 varied 12.2 
Thorndike (1938) “ 4 to 6 % wrong “ knowledge questions      30 varied   6.6 
Makridakis et al. (1993) “   5 MAPE monthly economic time series    322 1 thru 14 19.0 
Richards & Fraser (1977) “   5 “ annual company earnings    213 1   8.1 
Batchelor & Dua (1995) “ 10 MSE “ macroeconomic      40 1 16.4 
Kaplan et al. (1950) “ 26 % wrong cross-section technology events      16 varied 13.0 
Zarnowitz (1984) “ 79 RMSE quarterly macroeconomic    288 1 10.0 
Sanders & Ritzman (1989) extrapolation   3 MAPE daily public warehouse    260 1 15.1 
Makridakis & Winkler (1983) “   5 “ monthly economic time series    617 18 24.2 
Makridakis et al. (1993) “   5 “ “ “    322  1 thru 14   4.3 
Lobo (1992) “   5 “ quarterly company earnings 6,560 1 thru 4 13.6 
Schnaars (1986) “   7 “ annual consumer products 1,412 1 thru 5 20.0 
Landefeld & Seskin (1986) econometric   2 MAE annual plant & equipment       7 1 21.0 
Clemen & Winkler (1986) “   4 MAD quarterly GNP (real & nominal)      45 1 thru 4   3.4 
Shamseldin et al. (1997) “   5 MAPE annual rainfall runoff      22 1   9.4 
Lobo (1992) 
Lawrence et al. (1986) 
expert/extrap  
“ 
  2 
  3 
MAPE 
“ annual monthly
company earnings 
economic time series 
6,560 
1,224 
    1 thru 4 
  1 thru 18 
11.0 
10.7 
Sanders & Ritzman (1989) “   3 “ daily public warehouse    260 1 15.5 
Lobo & Nair (1990) “   4 “ annual company earnings    768 1   6.4 
Landefeld & Seskin (1986) intentions/econ  2 MAE annual plant & equipment      11 1 11.5 
Vandome (1963) extrap/econ  2 MAPE quarterly macroeconomic      20 1 10.1 
Armstrong (1985) “   2 “ annual photo sales by country      17 6   4.2 
Weinberg (1986) expert/econ   2 “ cross-section performing arts      15 varied 12.5 
Bessler & Brandt (1981) exprt/extrap/econ   3 “ quarterly cattle & chicken prices      48 1 13.6 
Fildes (1991) “   3 MAE annual construction      72 1 & 2   8.0 
Brandt & Bessler (1983) “   6 MAPE quarterly hog prices      24 1 23.5 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Unweighted average
 
12.5 
 
As can be seen, there are no tests of statistical significance in the exhibit. Evidence for the principles is 
summarized completely by effect sizes, in this case by “percent of error reduction” in the last column. In all 
cases, combined forecasts were more accurate than the typical method. The gains were substantial; there 
was, on average, an error reduction of more than 12%. Sometimes the combined forecast was even more 
accurate than the best of the components, although this is not noted in the table. Had tests of statistical 
significance been use in the assessment of value of combining, it might have led to the conclusion that 
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some of the small sample studies did not have sufficient data to be significant. The only effect here would 
be to discard useful information. Significance tests could not possibly affect the finding that combining 
reduces errors when compared to the error of the typical component, nor would they add any useful 
information. 
 
While the authors of KFHS were probably aware of the prior research, is it unlikely that the readers would 
be able to make this connection and to also realize that KFHS were testing whether the combined method 
was better than the best of the components not as in the original M3 paper (and in the above exhibit) 
whether combining is better than the typical method. In fact, the M3 competition yielded a 4.7% error 
reduction in comparison with the typical component. 
 
Accuracy measures 
KFHS wrote, “We discovered that there is a significant agreement among the results obtained from the 
various accuracy measures that have been used in the evaluations of the various competitions.” From this, 
readers might conclude that when comparing forecasting methods, the choice of an accuracy measure 
makes little difference.  
 
Again there are problems with the choice of a null hypothesis and the failure to use prior knowledge. For 
example, the analyses presented in Armstrong and Collopy (1992) showed that the selection of the most 
accurate extrapolation method varied substantially depending upon the choice of an accuracy measure. This 
was especially so when the number of series was modest. While that paper mentioned statistical 
significance on two occasions, we think that its use was harmless. Certainly, it was not needed to reach our 
conclusion. 
 
Discussion 
KFHS concluded that “An important implication . . . is that our analysis demonstrates the necessity for 
undertaking rigorous statistical testing in any evaluation of forecast accuracy . . . If this is not done, it is 
possible that one might draw erroneous conclusions from the descriptive statistics.” They claimed this was 
because the conclusions from the statistical analysis differed from those based on descriptive statistics.  
 
 In contrast, I argue that tests of statistical significance should never be used when reporting scientific 
findings.  The original M3-competition was unusual in departing from the norm by avoiding tests of 
statistical significance and it was also proper to do so. When one looks at the evidence to date, combining 
improves accuracy and the choice of an accuracy measures does matter. The significance tests by KFHS 
have only contributed to confusion on these issues. 
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My conclusions relate to the use of statistical significance in the development of knowledge about 
forecasting. This does not rule out the possibility that statistical significance might help in other areas such 
as in (1) aiding decision makers by flagging areas that need attention (e.g., quality control charts), (2) as 
part of a forecasting procedure (e.g., helping to decide whether to apply a seasonality adjustment or when 
to damp trends), or (3) serving as a guide a scientists who is analyzing a problem (e.g., as a quick way to 
highlight areas that need further study).  
 
Researchers should avoid tests of statistical significance when reporting their findings. As the journal 
reviewing system exists, however, researchers feel a need to include tests of significance. I have had 
discussions with co-authors on this topic and the decision has usually been to include some tests in order to 
gain favor with reviewers, but to do so in a way that is unlikely to harm the use of the findings.  
 
I join with others (e.g., Shea 1996; Hunter 1997) in suggesting that journals ban or at least discourage tests 
of statistical significance. The balance of evidence to date supports such a change. The challenge for the 
discussants is to provide cases where the use of statistical significance has contributed to scientific 
knowledge. Despite efforts to locate such studies, I am unaware of any. 
 
Conclusions 
Readers should be clear about the conclusions from the KFHS analysis of the M3-Competition. First, it did 
not refute the original M3 conclusion that combined forecasts are more accurate than those from the typical 
method. Second, it did not refute the conclusion that the choice of an accuracy measure is important when 
choosing among forecasting methods. 
 
Tests of statistical significance carry dangers when doing research related to the advancement of scientific 
knowledge about forecasting. To analyze and communicate findings from empirical studies, use effect 
sizes, confidence intervals, replications/extensions, and meta-analyses. 
 
Practitioners can take immediate action. They should ignore tests of statistical significance. Researchers 
can take this step when they write books or present papers. When writing for journals, they may have to 
seek ways of reducing the potential harm of reporting significance tests. They should also omit the word 
significance; findings that reject the null hypothesis are not significant in the everyday use of the term, and 
those that reject are not insignificant. 
 
In contrast with the KFHS conclusion on the value of significance testing, I join the ranks of those 
recommending that significance tests be eliminated from scientific journals. Such tests are difficult to do 
properly and to interpret correctly. Even when properly done, they do not lend themselves easily to 
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decision-making. Finally, even if properly done and properly interpreted, significance tests are unnecessary 
for scientific progress.  
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